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Abstract 
 Recently many scholars are greatly concerned about the influence of 
institutional investors on companies’ earnings information quality. 
Institutional investors have strong and professional team. With big fund stake 
on listed companies, institutional investors are theoretically thought of playing 
active role in supervising companies to ensure their investment safety and 
return. Much evidence has showed that institutional investors are becoming 
active institutional participation from past passive shareholders. The 
characteristics of institutional show great advantages on exerting their effect 
on corporate governance. Correspondingly positive behavior of institutional 
investors will influence the degree of the accounting information quality. 
Based on this concept, institutional investors can discover in a timely and 
effective manner problems existing in the accounting information disclosure. 
As a result, this article examines whether institutional investors as active 
shareholders can participate in corporate governance in order to improve 
companies’ accounting information quality. 
 
Keywords: Institutional investors, accounting conservatism, corporate 
governance 
 
1. Introduction 
 Institutional investors are important participants in the capital market. 
After 40 years of development, they have become an important force in the 
global capital market, especially in mature markets. Whether in developed or 
developing countries, the proportion of institutions in the structure of 
investment entities investors has gradually increased, and the tendency of 
institutionalization in financial markets has become more and more obvious. 
Especially in the 1980s, with the rise of shareholder activism represented by 
the California Public Retirement Fund, institutional investors themselves have 
grown stronger. The growth of capital power has also created conditions for 
the re-distribution of listed companies' equity in the capital market. The role 
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of institutional investors in corporate governance has not been underestimated, 
and has become important corporate governance mechanism. Global capital 
markets hope to strengthen their institutional investors and guide them to 
participate in corporate governance and overcome the original defects in the 
corporate governance system. Research on investment motives and economic 
consequences of institutional investors has gradually become a research 
hotspot of scholars from all over the world. At this stage, whether institutional 
investors can fully play a positive role in corporate governance is still a topic 
of widespread controversy in the academic community. Some scholars believe 
that institutional investors have a large advantage in the amount of funds, 
professionalism and information acquisition, and the role played in corporate 
governance is indispensable, which can inhibit the shortsighted selling of 
major shareholders to  certain extent. At the same time, some scholars believe 
that institutional investors have collusion with major shareholders and infringe 
on the interests of small and medium investors. 
 Chinese capital market began to serve Chinese listed companies and 
investors from the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 
market in the 1990s. At the beginning of this century, Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission clearly put forward the slogan of “supernormal 
development institutional investors”, and subsequently issued a series of laws 
and regulations aimed at promoting capital market reform. It is hoped that 
institutional investors will play an active role in improving the capital structure 
of Chinese securities market. With unique governance role to promote the 
development of listed companies, in the past two decades, institutional 
investors have become an important participant in the capital market, and have 
formed a pattern in which securities investment funds are the mainstay and 
multiple types of investors coexist. The publication of the "Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises" in 1992 marked formal establishment of 
the position of the conservatism principle in Chinese accounting standards 
system. In 2013, the General Office of the State Council promulgated the 
"Opinions on Further Strengthening the Protection of the Legal Rights and 
Interests of Small and Medium-sized Investors in the Capital Market", which 
pointed out that safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of small and 
medium-sized investors is not only a major purpose of securities supervision, 
but also the inevitable trend of capital markets development. To protect the 
right of small and medium-sized investors, one of the important measures is 
to improve the information disclosure system and fully improve the quality of 
information disclosure of listed companies. An important goal of China's "13th 
Five-Year Plan" is to build a multi-level capital market. To promote the 
development of market participants, regulate the investment behavior of 
market participants, and gradually improve the external governance 
mechanism of the market is an important aspect of building a multi-level 
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market. In 2016, the “ the Governance Guidelines of Listed Companies” 
issued by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission, reaffirming that 
institutional investors should play a role in many aspects of corporate major 
issues, director appointments, management incentives and supervision. This 
predicts that institutional investors as an emerging external and governance 
mechanism will play an important role in the “13th Five-Year Plan”. And 
correspondingly institutional investors will also play an important role in 
improving accounting information quality of invested enterprises. 
 Conservatism is one of the oldest accounting standards in accounting 
measurement. It has become a recognized accounting practice in the current 
period. In 2008, scholar Watt elaborated this concept from the perspective of 
the quality of earnings accounting information. Based on the specific 
indicators of empirical research, Basu (1997) proposed an inverse regression 
model and accurate calculation method for measurement of accounting 
conservatism. He believes that management should promptly record the 
possible losses, monitor market environment to avoid adverse consequences, 
and conservatively recognize earnings. Fundamentally, accounting 
conservatism is one means to ease agency problem. Nowadays, the academic 
research on accounting conservatism has gradually changed from its origin 
and development to the direction of corporate governance. As an important 
criterion for measuring accounting information quality, accounting 
conservatism helps to reduce agency costs, ease information asymmetry 
between external investors and corporate management, and improve corporate 
regulatory efficiency.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 The healthy development of institutional investors plays an important 
role in effective operation of capital market. This paper examines the impact 
of institutional investors on accounting conservatism based on data from 
Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets.  
 First, we examine whether shareholdings of institutional investors 
have influence on accounting conservatism. Compared with individual 
investors, institutional investors have an advantage in both shareholding and 
investment strength. Institutional investors have a higher shareholding in listed 
companies, which makes institutional investors have more voting rights in 
corporate shareholders’ meeting, which is likely to affect management 
decisions. At the same time, many small and medium-sized shareholders take 
high cost to collect information, and have weak ability to conduct market 
analysis independently. With weak information processing capabilities, they 
tend to show more common “free-riding” behavior and act as followers in the 
capital market. All these conditions further increase the influence of 
institutional investors on listed companies. 
 In addition, with high shareholding scale expected return is also high. 
When the value of listed companies is increasing, and the possibility of 
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institutional investors obtaining higher returns is further increased, which 
reversely will cause greater losses. In theory, institutional investors have 
sufficient motivation to participate in corporate governance, but the reality is 
still open to question. Therefore, this paper takes the data of Chinese listed 
companies from 2009 to 2015 as a sample to explore the impact of institutional 
investors' shareholding on the accounting conservatism of listed companies. 
 Second, we study whether the difference in the stability of institutional 
investors' shareholdings will have different effects on accounting 
conservatism. Due to the different sources of funds and their nature, there are 
usually a variety of institutional investors in capital market. In practice, their 
operational strategies and management models are also different. For example, 
for their own interests short-sighted institutional investors often have short-
term operation and investment manipulation, which has also caused great 
concern from outside world. So, are all types of institutional investors actively 
involved in corporate governance? Can such supervision be reflected in the 
robust form of financial reporting? Under the reality of Chinese emerging 
transition economy, we study whether heterogeneous institutional investors 
play an active role in stabilizing capital market and improving corporate 
governance. As expected by the government, institutional investor can reduce 
principal-agent cost and ease information asymmetry between major 
shareholders, minority shareholders and management. Thus they play an 
active role in promoting corporate accounting robustness. However, in terms 
of all these questions, there are no clear arguments yet. Therefore, this paper 
will study the influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism 
for Chinese domestic Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies. 
Starting with the different time and industry dimension from institutional 
investors to institutional investors, we measure the stability of institutional 
investors' shareholdings. We further divide institutional investors into stable 
and transactional types, analyzing their different impact on accounting 
conservatism. 
 The development of Chinese capital market has also driven the rapid 
development of institutional investors. The existing research mainly based on 
the influence of institutional investors on accounting conservatism has more 
or less limitations. This paper will define the institutional investors and 
classify them as stable type and transactional type, combined with China's 
special national conditions for research. In terms of measuring institutional 
investors, the shareholding ratio is an indicator widely quoted in many 
literatures. Based on this, this paper also uses the proportion of institutional 
investors as the basic indicators of institutional investors' investment behavior. 
However, different types of institutional investors have different investment 
motives. In order to analyze the influence of institutional investors on 
accounting conservatism in a more detailed way, this paper divides 
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institutional investors into stable and transactional types from two aspects of 
time and industry dimension, and further analyzes institutional investors. Both 
horizontal and vertical aspects were considered. At the same time, the 
comparison between stable institutional investors and transactional 
institutional investors shows that transactional institutional investors have a 
greater impact on accounting conservatism. 
 
2. Literature review 
 In the past three decades, how institutional investors have played a role 
in corporate governance has always been the focus of academic research. As 
for how institutional investors influence corporate governance, the three 
theoretical hypotheses proposed by Pound (1988) fully summarize this: 
efficient supervision hypothesis, conflict of interest hypothesis and strategic 
alliance hypothesis. The efficient supervision hypothesis holds that compared 
with individual investors, institutional investors have sufficient ability and 
motivation to supervise corporate management, reduce speculative behavior 
and improve reliability of accounting information quality. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) suggest that institutional investors can play an active role in raising 
information transparency and reducing agency problems in listed companies. 
Grier and Zychowicz (1994) found that institutional investors' shareholding 
ratio and corporate financial leverage are inversely related. The reduction in 
financial leverage means a decline in corporate financial risk, which fully 
demonstrates that institutional investors play an effective supervisory role in 
corporate governance. Chidambaran (2000) research showed that institutional 
investors play a role in transferring corporate information from management 
to external investors, effectively reducing information asymmetry between 
them. Mitra (2005) suggested that a high percentage of institutional investors’ 
shareholding can effectively reduce corporate management's opportunistic 
behavior. Enriques (2005) also reached the same conclusion in an empirical 
study based on the Italian market. Xiao Xing (2005) takes the data from 
Chinese capital market in 2002 as a sample. The study found that institutional 
investors have already played a role in corporate governance. Zhang Chun 
(2007) examined the level of governance of institutional investors from the 
perspective of financing constraints and found that it can alleviate the 
financing problem of non-state-owned listed companies’ over-reliance on 
internal funds and provide support for the improvement of long-term financing 
capabilities. In addition, Gao Lei and Zhang Jie (2008) also believe that 
institutional investors' shareholding levels and corporate governance are on 
the rise and are negatively correlated with earnings management. 
 The conflict of interest hypothesis holds that institutional investors 
may collude with management to sacrifice the interests of minority 
shareholders for their own benefit. The strategic alliance hypothesis holds that 
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if institutional investors find that the proceeds from collusion with corporate 
management are higher than the gains from effective supervision; institutional 
investors may collude with them, thereby damaging the interests of other 
minority shareholders. Both believe that institutional investors may collude 
with management. Moreover, institutional investors have obvious short-
sightedness, mainly focusing on the arbitrage behavior of short-term stocks, 
focusing on frequent trading to obtain spreads. This self-interest will be 
transmitted to the company through price transmission mechanism, which will 
also cause the company to focus on short-term operation. Bhi (1993) suggested 
that some institutional investors have behaviors that encourage management 
to pursue short-term interests. Wahal and Mcfinell (2000) argue that 
institutional investors have not played their due role in management's short-
term behavior. At the same time, Renneboog (2000) based on the study of the 
Belgian capital market also proved this point. he pointed out that institutional 
investors did not really play a role in corporate governance. Grinstein (2005) 
also pointed out that institutional investors will fully measure the relationship 
between market returns and governance costs. And only when institutional 
investors' supervision returns are higher than costs, they will actively take 
action on possible agency problems. Gao Shenghao and Guan Xinyu (2012) 
compared the accounting earnings of listed companies with no institutional 
investors and listed companies with institutional investors. And they found 
that institutional investors fail to play a role in corporate governance. In 
addition, some scholars have proposed invalid hypotheses. For example, 
Admatietall (1994) proposed that in the supervision of corporate management, 
institutional investors need to pay a certain cost, and each shareholder wants 
other shareholders to pay the cost to supervise management, which will cause 
the so-called "free rider" behavior. 
 Beginning in the 1990s, the fair value under the International 
Accounting Standards was widely used, and scholars began to conduct 
systematic research on accounting conservatism. As early as 1924, Bliss 
(1924) put forward the idea of ‘recognizing all losses, but not recognizing all 
gains’, which is also the prototype of the concept of accounting conservatism. 
Basu (1997) used market price to reflect this trait in preference to accounting 
information. For accounting earnings, the market response degree of bad news 
is much higher than those of good news. This result visualized asymmetry and 
timeliness of accounting conservatism. It is now widely used in the accounting 
field. In order to study the timeliness of different companies in confirming 
economic losses, Ball (2005) divided the British companies into two 
categories, listed and unlisted. It was found that the listed companies 
recognized the losses faster. He believed that this was mainly due to the 
different types of companies and their different demand for accounting 
conservatism. Fangere and Shawky (2003) found that institutional investors 
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are more inclined to invest in more stable stocks when the stock market is 
sluggish. 
 In China, most scholars believe that institutional investors play a 
positive role in improving accounting conservatism. Cheng Shuqiang (2006), 
Wen Zhanglin (2010), and Wang Zhen (2014) have all shown through 
empirical research that institutional investors can effectively improve the 
accounting stability of listed companies. However, Chen Aihua (2014) puts 
forward the opposite view. Based on the perspective of market heterogeneity, 
he shows that the increase in the shareholding ratio of institutional investors 
will reduce the accounting conservatism. In addition, Li Kai (2011) found that 
the different stages of the stock market will lead to differences in accounting 
conservatism: when the stock market is in the upswing period, institutional 
investors are easy to collude with management to obtain excess returns. At this 
time, institutional investors’ shareholding is negatively correlated with 
accounting conservatism, while it is not in a significant relationship during the 
downturn. 
 Some scholars also start from the heterogeneity of institutional 
investors and analyze their relationship with accounting conservatism. The 
types of institutional investors are found to be different, and their impact on 
accounting conservatism is also very different. Liu Jingjun and Xu Haoping 
(2012) classified them as long-term and short-term institutional investors 
based on the turnover rate of institutional investors. It is found that short-term 
institutional investors are more likely to have an impact on accounting 
conservatism. Zou Xiujing (2014) divided institutional investors into 
securities investment funds, brokerage firms, insurance companies, social 
security funds, and QFIIs. It pointed out that securities investment funds and 
brokerage firms have a significantly lower role in promoting accounting 
conservatism than social security funds, insurance companies and QFIIs. Wu 
Lianghai (2017) divided institutional investors into transactional and stable 
types, and found that stable institutional investors can promote the 
improvement of corporate accounting conservatism and improve corporate 
investment efficiency. 
As main participators of corporate equity capital, institutional 
investors play the role of principal in the principal-agent theory, while the 
management of the invested enterprise is the agent. Therefore information 
asymmetry and interest conflicts exist between them, which unavoidably 
results in agency problem. Shleifer (1986) found that compared with the small 
and medium-sized shareholders in the market, larger institutional investors can 
effectively supervise corporate management and provide an effective solution 
to conflict problems of principal-agent relationship between shareholders and 
management. Therefore, institutional investors, as supplement to external 
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governance mechanism, intervene in corporate governance as the principal, 
which is equivalent to the supervisor in the corporate governance mechanism. 
Moreover, institutional investors become corporate shareholders 
through shareholding, enjoy corporate interests, and strive to seek solutions to 
information asymmetry in order to protect their own interests. But this 
approach also needs to consider the issue of excessive supervision costs. 
Numerous research results show that accounting conservatism can effectively 
solve information asymmetry problem and keep supervision cost basically 
unchanged. Watt (2003) proposed that accounting conservatism can 
effectively reduce moral hazard. Lafond's (2008) study results also shows that 
because accounting conservatism usually treats profit and loss with required 
caution, it can effectively reduce information asymmetry between corporate 
management and external investors. Therefore, institutional investors can 
reduce information asymmetry without increasing agency costs by means of 
improving conservatism of accounting information quality. As a result, mature 
institutional investors have the need and motivation to promote corporate 
accounting conservatism. Mature institutional investors will supervise and 
constrain management to ensure that the investment level they choose can 
maximize corporate long-term value rather than simply meet short-term gain 
targets, alleviating the principal-agent problems arising from ownership and 
management rights, and aligning corporate management’s Strategic and 
operational decisions to directly improve corporate performance. 
After reviewing research results of domestic and foreign scholars on 
institutional investors and corporate governance, institutional investors and 
accounting conservatism, it can be found that internationally, the formulation 
of accounting conservatism began in the late 20th century, but until the 21th 
century a few scholars gradually began to get involved in this field. Many 
research results in this field have proved the importance of accounting 
conservatism without exception. Early foreign scholars began with the concept 
of accounting conservatism, refined the classification of various measurement 
indicators, and completed a series of research process from qualitative to 
quantitative analyses in this emerging field. With further development of 
accounting conservatism, research results of domestic scholars are mainly 
concentrated in two aspects: one is to determine the existence of accounting 
conservatism in China, and the other is to find some factors that affect 
accounting conservatism. Chinese capital market has gradually improved after 
several decades of development, coupled with the strength increase of national 
supervision and regulation, accounting conservatism has been further 
enhanced. Scholars who have deeply studied Chinese capital market have also 
proposed other factors that affect accounting conservatism, such as 
information disclosure, shareholding structure, accounting system changes 
since 2007. But with the changing external environment and the annual growth 
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of institutional investors, the factors affecting accounting conservatism will 
also correspondingly change. This paper studies the impact of institutional 
investor and their heterogeneity on accounting conservatism. Our research 
results will provide a certain theoretical and practical insight. 
At present, the number and types of institutional investors in China 
continue to increase, and it has become an investment entity that cannot be 
underestimated in Chinese capital market. With the continuous liberalization 
of market access restrictions, many types of institutional investors have 
entered the securities market, and the scale of market entry has been 
expanding, showing a diversified character. They will inevitably have an 
impact on the corporate governance of listed companies. The improvement in 
corporate governance will further improve enterprise business level in an all-
round way, and the two complement each other. At present, most of the 
researches take institutional investors as a whole, and take the shareholding 
ratio as an independent variable to analyze their impact on accounting 
conservatism from the aspects of information disclosure, financing 
constraints, and earnings management. Although some researchers also 
conduct classified studies of institutional investors, their classification is 
mainly based on the business relationship between institutional investors and 
listed companies, which is too singular. It should be noted that institutional 
investors' supervision of listed companies is based on multiple motives, and 
independence is only one of them. It is inevitable that the institutional 
investors' shareholding stability differences will be ignored. Therefore, it is 
necessary to comprehensively consider the impact of different types of 
institutional investors' shareholding on accounting conservatism. This paper 
divides institutional investors into stable and transactional types from two 
aspects of time and industry dimension, and further analyzes institutional 
investors’ impact on accounting conservatives. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
Since Basu (1997) used the inverse regression model to quantify 
accounting conservatism, the influencing factors of accounting conservatism 
have gradually become the research problems of scholars. The more 
representative is to use the level of stock returns to measure the level of 
accounting conservatism. Institutional investors are an important part of 
corporate governance mechanism. An important assessment of corporate 
governance participation is to observe the degree of accounting conservatism 
of the invested company. 
In 2000, China Securities Regulatory Commission put forward the 
slogan of “supernormal development institutional investors”, which has 
played a positive role in promoting the development of institutional investors 
in China in the past two decades. First of all, institutional investors are a 
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professional expert body, which concentrates the funds of most persons and 
has sufficient strength to become a major shareholder of the company. It has 
the characteristics of scale effect, portfolio investment and high investment 
efficiency, and strong capabilities of bearing risk. To ensure the continuity and 
stability of their return, institutional investors often use their own capital 
advantages, professional and technological advantages, and information 
advantages to effectively supervise management in corporate governance and 
improve accounting conservatism. Secondly, institutional investors are mostly 
long-term strategic investments. In the past, “voting with the feet” is no longer 
in line with the law of economic development. When corporate operating 
conditions are not good, selling stocks may bring shock to the entire stock 
market. In the long run, institutional investors tend to buy and sell corporate 
stocks in a more rational way to promote corporate healthy growth in order to 
obtain long-term regulatory benefits. If institutional investors excessively 
pursue short-term gains, it will result in a false high accounting earnings and 
a large amount of expenses and delays in the confirmation of losses. It is 
difficult to meet the requirements of institutional investors for long-term 
interests. Therefore, institutional investors have higher requirements to 
conservatism of accounting information. 
At the same time, the role of institutional investors as effective 
supervisors in corporate governance can also alleviate two types of agency 
problems: First, institutional investors have a high shareholding ratio and have 
sufficient incentives to supervise all kinds of self-interested behavior of 
management. While gaining their interest, it also eases the conflict between 
shareholders and management. Second, institutional investors, as the third-
party forces between controlling shareholders and small and medium-sized 
shareholders, based on their own financial advantages and professional 
capabilities, have sufficient advantages of alleviating conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. When an institutional 
investor chooses to invest in a listed company, it needs to evaluate the 
company to prevent and estimate risks. If the company provides conservative 
financial statements, institutional investors will have a greater chance of 
choosing the company. Finally, when institutional investors hold corporate 
shares for a long time, in order to prevent investment risks and protect capital 
investment at a lower cost, the internal management personnel of the invested 
enterprise will be supervised, and the motivation to prevent their self-interest 
will improve accounting conservatism. Furthermore, if conservative financial 
statements enhance quality of corporate governance, institutional investors 
can easily obtain value interest from it, which in turn requires management to 
continue to provide conservative accounting information for each fiscal year. 
Combining above theoretical analyses, institutional investors have sufficient 
motivation and demand to supervise the daily operation of the enterprise, 
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thereby improving accounting conservatism. Hence, the greater the proportion 
of institutional shareholding, the higher institutional investors’ interest related 
to corporate performance, they will tend to implement effective supervision 
and further influence quality of corporate accounting conservatism. 
 Based on these analyses, we can get hypothesis 1: The total 
shareholding proportion of institutional investors is positively correlated 
with accounting conservatism. 
 In theory, institutional investors have different motives for 
participating in corporate governance. Some institutional investors have 
sufficient willingness and sufficient ability to participate in corporate 
governance, and are not affected by the company's stakeholders. They have a 
strong motivation to influence the company. On the contrary, some 
institutional investors lack the strong motivation to participate in corporate 
governance for a variety of reasons, and are more willing to carry out short-
term investment operations that maximize their own interests. Previous studies 
have shown that more stable institutional investors can provide long-term 
incentives for management and focus on improving the company's long-term 
performance, with less focus on short-term performance and stock price 
changes. 
 Institutional investors with short-term view tend to trading and 
influencing stock prices and managing earnings, forcing companies to pursue 
short-term interests and weaken corporate core competitiveness. Furthermore, 
it can be seen that institutional investors with different purposes and stability 
have different requirements for accounting conservatism. 
 In the previous discussion, this paper divides institutional investors 
into stable and transactional types from both the time and industry dimension. 
Stable institutional investors are institutional investors who hold shares in the 
listed company for a long time. At present, institutional investors in China are 
developing rapidly under the policy guidance of vigorously developing 
institutional investors. In general, various institutional investors have 
sufficient management experience and investment strategy. But stable 
institutional investors have a long-term shareholding, pay more attention to 
improving corporate long-term interests and hope to share corporate future 
growth interest. So they will actively participate in corporate governance and 
improve performance stability level. In addition, longer shareholding time and 
higher shareholding ratio will also increase the weight of institutional 
investors' participation in management. Long-term investment makes it more 
influential in the enterprise. For decision-making of corporate long-term 
orientation, major shareholders and corporate management will consult 
institutional investors’ opinions to a certain extent. The long-term holding 
time of stable institutional investors also makes them more familiar with the 
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internal conditions of enterprises. Hence long-term stable institutional 
investors will contribute more to improvement of accounting conservatism. 
 Trading institutional investors mainly use internal information to gain 
advantages by short-term stock trading. Therefore, improving accounting 
conservatism has more harm than good for them. At the same time, trading 
institutional investors usually has weak influence on enterprises, and has a low 
shareholding ratio, which lacks sufficient influence on management. Shorter 
holding time also causes trading institutional investors to have less motivation 
to fully analyze the company's operating conditions. It is more difficult to have 
a deeper understanding of the company in a shorter period of time. Trading 
institutional investors have sufficient incentives to conduct short-term 
transactions under the dual guidance of performance pressure and profit-
driven. On the contrary, stable institutional investors tend to use its strong 
funds, professional investment strategies and internal information advantages 
to participate in corporate management and governance. Therefore, the 
influence of transactional institutional investors on accounting conservatism 
should be lower than that of stable institutional investors. Based on these 
analyses, combined with hypothesis 1, we can get hypothesis 2: Stable 
institutional investors have a greater impact on accounting conservatism 
than trading institutional investors.                                                                                                                        
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Sample selection and data sources 
 This paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2009 to 2015 as the research object. In order 
to verify the accuracy and reliability of the research, this paper screens the 
original data according to the following principles: (1) Excluding the financial 
and insurance industry companies, because the operation and supervision of 
this financial industry are different from other companies. (2) Excluding ST, 
*ST, PT and other companies with special treatment, as there may be problems 
with financial manipulation. (3) Excluding the IPO companies of the current 
year because when the listed company first issued shares, its return on equity 
(ROA) has the possibility of artificially increasing, and the accounting 
earnings is different from other years with low comparability. (4) Excluding 
companies without institutional investors’ shareholding and with a lack of 
shareholding ratio for institutional investors in the past three years, as this 
paper focuses on the impact of institutional investors on accounting 
conservatism and is measured in terms of time and industry dimensions. The 
classification of institutional investors requires the use of shareholding ratio 
data for the past three years. (5) Excluding companies with missing key 
financial data. After the above screening, the paper finally obtained 11202 
observations, including 1065 in 2009, 1202 in 2010, 1534 in 2011, 1686 in 
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2012, 1709 in 2013, 1921 in 2014 and 2085 in 2015. In addition, in order to 
reduce the impact of extreme data on study results, all data were winsorize 
processed by at the 1% and 99% quartiles of the samples. 
 
4.2 Variables definition  
This paper selects the inverse regression model of BASU: 
 EPSit/Pit-1=β0+β1DRit+β2Retit+β3Retit*DRit+eit 
EPSit represents the net earnings per share of the company i for the year. 
Pit-1 is the closing price of the stock at the end of the previous period of 
company i. Retit is the cumulative annual rate of return for company I adjusted 
by market index. DR is a dummy variable. When Retit <0, it means bad 
message, DR=1; otherwise, it takes 0, which means good news. In the model, 
β2 represents the response degree of accounting earnings to good news, and 
the sum (β2+β3) represents response degree of accounting earnings to bad 
news. The difference between the response degree of good news and bad news 
is the accounting conservatism. Further, when β3>0, it indicates that  
accounting earnings reacts to bad news faster than the good news, that is, the 
accounting information has the characteristics of conservatism.  
 This model is a direct reflection of conservatism definition and can be 
used to measure accounting conservatism more intuitively. The accounting 
earnings response lags behind the excess return of corporate stock. At the same 
time, the inverse regression model uses the accounting earnings as the 
dependent variable and the stock return as the independent variable. At this 
time, it meets the requirements of the least squares method itself, so this can 
better set the standard error and variable statistics. In the past research, the 
model has also been adopted by many scholars, and its effectiveness has been 
fully verified, so this paper will also use Basu's inverse regression model to 
measure accounting conservatism. 
 
4.2.1 Selection of explanatory variables 
(1) Institutional investor shareholding ratio (Ins): In this paper, this 
indicator is the total number of institutional investors holding shares divided 
by corporate outstanding common shares. 
 (2) Proportion of stable institutional investors (Pri): When institutional 
investor sharehoding ratio divided by standard deviation of institutional 
investor's shareholding in the past three years is greater than or equal to the 
median of the above ratio in the industry, the company's institutional investors 
are regarded as stable institutional investors who can actively participate in 
corporate governance to improve performance. 
(3)Trading institutional investor shareholding ratio (Npi): When 
institutional investor shareholdings ratio divided by standard deviation of 
institutional investor's shareholding in the past three years is less than the 
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median of the above ratio in the industry, the company's institutional investors 
are regarded as transactional institutional investors who try to gain excess 
return through short-term speculation and has a weaker impact on enhancing 
accounting conservatism. 
 
4.2.2 Selection of control variables 
 In order to better explain the relationship between institutional 
investors and accounting conservatism, this paper controls the following 
variables: 
 (1) Nature of property rights (Soe): The nature of the actual controller 
of the enterprise. If it is a state-owned enterprise, take 1 and non-state-owned 
enterprises take 0. Zhu Chafen and Li Zhiwen (2008) show that China's 
institutional environment is quite special, and because of the existence of “soft 
budget constraints”, equity investors and bond investors focus less on the 
accounting information of state-owned enterprises, and thus less demand their 
accounting conservatism. In order to control the difference in accounting 
conservatism between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises, the nature of corporate property rights is regarded as one of the 
control variables. 
 (2) Size of the company(Size): It is expressed in terms of the natural 
logarithm of the total assets at the end of the period. Larger companies have 
more complex agency relationships, and their information will be concerned 
by many parties such as tax authorities and securities analysts. The higher the 
legal cost, the more cautious the disclosure of information, so they are more 
inclined to disclose conservative financial statements to reduce their legal 
costs (Khan and Watt, 2009) 
  (3) Debt ratio (Lev): Total liabilities at the end of the year divided by 
total assets at the end of the year. The debt ratio is a key indicator of corporate 
solvency. Companies with higher debt ratios will face greater financial risks, 
and the pressure on paying principal and interest will be greater, and 
repayment of liabilities may lead to a decrease in working capital and thus 
adversely affects company performance. In order to guarantee their own 
interests, creditors will strengthen their binding role on debt contracts and 
require more conservative accounting information. 
 (4) Return on total assets (ROA): The ratio of net profit divided by the 
average asset balance at the beginning and end of the year. The profitability of 
a company has a greater impact on the choice of management accounting 
policies (Xia Donglin and Li Gang, 2008). The stronger the profitability of an 
enterprise, the more motivated it is to use accounting conservatism. Therefore, 
ROA needs to be used as a profitability proxy variable to control the impact 
of profitability on corporate accounting conservatism. 
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 (5) Ratio of market value of the company to net book value at the end 
of the year (Mtb): net asset market price/book value. Studies have shown that 
the degree of uncertainty about earnings and losses (ie, the level of accounting 
conservatism) is negatively correlated, while Mtb is often used to measure the 
overall robustness of the overall report. Therefore, it is more reasonable to 
include the ratio of the year-end market value to the net book value (Mtb) to 
control their impact on accounting conservatism. 
 (6) Tobin Q: TobinQ = (end-of-year equity market value + net debt 
market value) / total assets at the end of the period. For some companies with 
greater potential for growth, their level of accounting conservatism may be 
lower due to the motivation of overstating profits. But investors will be more 
difficult to supervise them, and require them to provide more conservative 
accounting information. Therefore, TobinQ is regarded as a control variable 
in this study. The higher the TobinQ value means the higher the return on 
investment ROI, and institutional investors will have a huge incentive to enter 
the market. 
 (7) Industry: excluding the special financial and insurance industry. 
Table 1: Variables Definition 
Variable Definition and Measurement 
Dep
end
ent 
vari
able 
EPSit/Pit-1 EPSit represents the net earnings per share of the company i for the year. 
Pit-1 is the closing price of the stock at the end of the previous period of 
company i. 
 
 
 
 
 
Inde
pen
dent 
vari
able  
 
Retit Retit is the cumulative annual rate of return for company i adjusted by 
market index. 
Dr DR is a dummy variable. When Retit <0, it means bad message, DR=1; 
otherwise, it takes 0, which means good news. 
Ins The total number of institutional investors holding shares divided by 
corporate outstanding common shares. 
Pri When institutional investor sharehoding ratio divided by standard 
deviation of institutional investor's shareholding in the past three years 
is greater than or equal to the median of the above ratio in the industry, 
the company's institutional investors are regarded as stable institutional 
investors. 
Npi When institutional investor shareholdings ratio divided by standard 
deviation of institutional investor's shareholding in the past three years 
is less than the median of the above ratio in the industry, the company's 
institutional investors are regarded as transactional institutional 
investors 
 
 
 
Con
trol 
Soe The nature of the actual controller of the enterprise. If it is a state-
owned enterprise, take 1 and non-state-owned enterprises take 0. 
Size It is expressed in terms of the natural logarithm of the total assets at the 
end of the period. 
ROA The ratio of net profit divided by the average asset balance at the 
beginning and end of the year. 
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vari
able 
Lev Total liabilities at the end of the year divided by total assets at the end 
of the year. 
Mtb Ratio of market value of the company to net book value at the end of 
the year 
TobinQ TobinQ = (end-of-year equity market value + net debt market value) / 
total assets at the end of the period. 
Industry Excluding the special financial and insurance industry. 
 
4.3 Research model 
 In this paper, Basu's inverse regression model is adopted. On the basis 
of it, the interpret variable and the cross terms of Dr, Ret and Dr*Ret are added. 
The model is built as follows: 
EPSit/Pit-
1=β0+β1Drit+β2Retit+β3Retit*Drit+β4*Insit+β5*Drit*Insit+β6*Retit*Insit
+β7*Drit*Insit*Retit+controlit+eit   
 
Init indicates that institutional investors’ shareholding proportion at the 
end of year t, and join the control variable Soe, which represents enterprise 
nature, company size Size, Debt ratio Lev, total return on assets Roa, 
company’s year-end market value to net book value Mtb Tobin Q, industry 
control variable, mainly to investigate the impact of the coefficient β7 of the 
interactive term DRit*Insit*Retit on accounting conservatism. According to 
the hypothesis 1 of this paper, β7 should be greater than 0. In the test of 
Hypothesis 2, the institutional investors are classified into stable and trading 
types according to the previous analysis, and are substituted into the model for 
testing, namely: 
EPSit/Pit-
1=β0+β1Drit+β2Retit+β3Retit*Drit+β4*Priit+β5*Drit*Priit+β6*Retit*Priit
+β7*Drit*Priit*Retit+controlit+eit                          (1)   
EPSit/Pit-
1=β0+β1Drit+β2Retit+β3Retit*Drit+β4*Npiit+β5*Drit*Npiit+β6*Retit*Np
iit+β7*Drit*Npiit*Retit+controlit+eit                       (2) 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive analyses 
Mean St.Dev Median Max Min 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable      N        Mean         Median       St.Dev        Max        Min 
EPS/Pit-1      11202       0.029      0.024       0.040        0.168       -0.154 
Ret       11202       0.267      0.039       0.683        3.038       -0.527 
Dr       11202        0.466     0.000       0.499         1.000       0.000 
Ins       11202       0.410      0.414       0.229         0.985       0.000 
Pri       5658        0.485      0.493       0.200         0.985       0.028 
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Npi      5544        0.333       0.305      0.230         0.982       0.000 
Soe      11202       0.457       0.000      0.498         1.000       0.000 
Size      11202      22.129      21.947      1.247        25.912      19.742 
Roa      11202      0.042        0.037      0.051        0.203       -0.156 
Lev      11202      0.453        0.456      0.211        0.896       0.050 
Mtb      11202      1.618        1.214      1.024        5.128       0.086 
TobinQ     11202      2.219        1.628      2.021        11.681       0.195 
 
 In this sample, the average earnings per share of Eps/Pit-1 is 0.029, the 
median value is 0.024, slightly right-biased, and the average value of the total 
sample middle-year stock return rate Ret of 0.267 is significantly greater than 
the Ret median of 0.039, indicating the annual stock return rate is unevenly  
distributed with a significant right deviation. From the distribution 
characteristics of accounting earnings Eps/Pit-1 and annual stock return rate 
Ret, the accounting earnings’ market responses are asymmetrical to the good 
news and bad news, that is, the losses are confirmed more timely than the 
gains. 
 The median and average value of accounting earnings per share 
Eps/Pit-1 are greater than 0, indicating that the listed company selected in this 
study is profitable overall, the overall economic environment is better, and the 
maximum value is 0.168, the minimum value is -0.154, each group of data is 
guaranteed to have appropriate differences. From the volatility of the two, 
Ret's standard deviation is 0.6846, which is much larger than the standard 
deviation of per share accounting earnings Eps/Pit-1 of 0.040, indicating that 
the volatility of stock returns is higher than the accounting earnings per share, 
which is in line with the emerging country capital market. The characteristics 
indicate that accounting conservatism exists within the sample interval.The 
average market value to book value is 1.618, and the median is 1.214, both of 
which are greater than 1. This indicates that the market value of listed 
companies in China is greater than the book value, and its financial statements 
can reflect the accounting conservatism. 
 The average return on assets Roa is 0.042, and the median value is 
0.037, which indicates that the overall profit level of the sample companies 
selected is slightly lower. This is mainly because the sample of this study is 
selected from listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares, and most 
of them have grown and matured. During the period, profitability has 
gradually stabilized. The overall shareholding ratio of institutional investors 
is 0.410, the maximum value is 0.985, and the minimum value is 0.000, 
indicating that the institutional investors in China are generally unevenly 
distributed, and the polarization between the two poles is more serious, which 
may be related to the status of individual stocks. In terms of enterprise nature 
Soe, its average value is 0.457, which indicates that the number of state-owned 
enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in China's capital market is 
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basically balanced. The number of non-state-owned enterprises is slightly 
more, which is consistent with the basic situation of China's capital market and 
is representative. The median and mean values of TobinQ in the sample are all 
greater than 1, indicating that the market value of listed companies in China is 
higher than the replacement cost. Enterprises will continue to increase 
investment expenditures in pursuit of maximizing value. 
 
5.2 Regression results 
 Table 3 show regression results of the four models as follows: (1) the 
basic Basu model, that is, the accounting robustness is tested; (2) the influence 
of the institutional investor's total shareholding ratio Ins on accounting 
conservatism; 3) The impact of stable institutional investors Pri on accounting 
conservatism; (4) The impact of trading-type institutional investors Npi on 
accounting conservatism. Model 1 is the Basu inverse regression model. 
Substituting the sample data of this paper gives the regression results of (1) in 
Table 3. The coefficient β3 of Ret*Dr is 0.117 (T value is 10.544), which is 
significantly positive at the level of 1%, indicating that the bad news reacts 
faster in the accounting earnings than the good news. The sum of the 
coefficient β2 and β3 is 0.175, which is greater than the reaction degree of 
accounting earnings on good news β2, which proves that the accounting 
conservatism is widely present in the listed enterprises in China. 
 Model 2 adds explanatory variables and control variables to model 1. 
The regression results in (2) of table 3 are tests for hypothesis 1. The results 
show that the coefficient of Ins* Dr*Ret is 0.084 (Tvalue is 5.549), which is 
significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that institutional investors can 
effectively improve accounting conservatism, thus proving that hypothesis 1 
indicates that the higher the proportion of institutional investors in China, the 
better the accounting conservatism. That is, the proportion of institutional 
investors' shares is positively related to accounting conservatism. This positive 
impact stems from the natural characteristics of institutional investors who 
seek to maximize their benefits by forming a contractual relationship with 
small and medium investors to obtain their funds and investment. On the one 
hand, compared with small and medium-sized individual investors, 
institutional investors have the characteristics of low information cost, 
reasonable risk diversification, high-scale benefits and strong supervision. 
Therefore, as an important external shareholder of the company, they are more 
willing to pay attention to the development of listed companies. With larger 
amount of investment funds and professional team, institutional investors are 
more motivated to supervise corporate operating and financial level to gain 
long-term return. Conservative accounting information provides a low-cost 
and effective indirect mean for obtaining this supervision information. On the 
other hand, due to the consideration of principal-agent relationship and subject 
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to the constraints of the regulatory authorities, behavioral interventions of 
institutional investors participating corporate governance have been strongly 
limited. In the long run, after trading off between investment return and 
monitoring costs, institutional investors will choose to supervise the 
management of the invested entity through accounting conservatism rather 
than direct intervention. 
 On the basis of Hypothesis 1, this paper divides institutional investors 
into two types: stable and transactional, according to the two dimensions of 
investment time and industry. Models 3 and 4 are respectively constructed to 
verify hypothesis 2. In Table 3, (3) is the regression result of stable 
institutional investors on accounting conservatism, and (4) is the regression 
result of transactional institutional investors on accounting conservatism. In 
(3), the coefficient of Pri* Dr*Ret is 0.069 (T value is 2.584), and the 
coefficient of Npi* Dr*Ret in (4) is 0.055 (T value is 3.010), at a significance 
level of 1%. The coefficient is significantly positive, indicating that stable 
institutional investors and transactional institutional investors are positively 
correlated with accounting conservatism. By comparing the coefficient value, 
the impact of stable institutional investors on accounting conservatism is 
significantly higher than that of transactional institutional investors, thus 
proving hypothesis 2. This shows that in Chinese capital market, the positive 
impact of listed companies on accounting conservatism is mainly due to stable 
institutional investors, while the trading institutional investors have a slightly 
weaker impact on the accounting conservatism of the invested companies. 
This may be due to the fact that stable institutional investors tend to prefer 
long-term investing shareholdings. The amount of investment and the scale is 
relatively large. The leverage effect of gains and losses from the investment is 
more obvious, so they have stronger motivation to monitor management. A 
simple and effective way to supervise is to require management to provide 
more conservative financial reporting, so they will require higher accounting 
conservatism for listed companies. However stability indicators of 
transactional institutional investor are lower than the median of the industry in 
that year. Their lower shareholding stability makes it less demanding on the 
quality of accounting information of listed companies. Therefore stable 
institutional investors have a higher impact on accounting conservatism than 
transactional institutional investors. 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Institutions ’shareholdings on Accounting Conservatism 
Variable          (1)                 (2)               (3)                 (4) 
Intercept         -0.103***           -0.107***          -0.105***           -0.110*** 
                 (-15.501)            (-15.646)           (-10.357)            (-11.958) 
Dr             -0.038***             -0.039***           -0.066***            -0.010        
                (-3.197)             (-3.328)           (-3.962)              (-0.593) 
 
Ret             0.058***             0.058***           0.050***            0.069*** 
                (6.209)              (6.202)            (3.802)              (5.199) 
Dr*Ret          0.117***            0.047***           0.061***             0.065*** 
                (10.544)             (2.851)            (2.122)               (3.146) 
Ins                                0.020*** 
                                   (2.242) 
Ins* Dr*Ret                         0.084***            
                                   (5.649)     
Pri                                                  -0.021*** 
                                                     (-1.639) 
Pri* Dr*Ret                                            0.069*** 
                                                     (2.584) 
Npi                                                                       0.033*** 
                                                                          (2.716) 
Npi* Dr*Ret                                                                0.055*** 
                                                                          (3.010) 
 
AdjustR2             0.494                0.496               0.494             0.502 
F-statistic        257.015              161.176             100.441           62.419 
N               11202               11202               5658            5544 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
5.3 Robustness test 
 Regression results of the model selected in this paper respectively 
prove the hypothesis 1 and 2, which support the inspection role of institutional 
investors by examining their impact on accounting conservatism. In order to 
prove that the above results are not accidental and avoid endogeneity, this 
paper also uses institutional data with one year lagged to build model 3: 
EPSit/Pit-
1=β0+β1DRit+β2Retit+β3Retit*DRit+β4*Insit+1+β5*DRit*Insit+1+β6*Retit*Insit+1
+β7*DRit*Insit+1*Retit+controlit+eit                    (3) 
  
Table 4 below is the regression result of one-year lagged institutional 
investors' shareholding on accounting conservatism. It can be found that the 
coefficient of Dr*Ret in (1) is 0.117, which is positive at the significant level 
of 1%; (2) The coefficient of Ins* Dr*Ret is 0.084, which is also positive at 
the 1% significance level. The regression results of both indicate that the 
empirical data is robust. Total  institutional shareholding ratio and accounting 
conservatism are still positive. In addition, in (3) and (4), both the stable and 
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trading institutional investors have passed the significant test at the 1% level. 
By comparing the correlation coefficient between the stable and trading 
institutional investors, we found that the accounting conservatism level of 
stable institutional investors was higher than that of passive institutional 
investors, and both hypotheses 1 and 2 were verified. 
Table 4: Robustness test results 
Variable            (1)                 (2)               (3)                 (4) 
Intercept          -0.103***           -0.107***          -0.105***           -0.110*** 
                 (-15.501)            (-15.646)           (-10.357)            (-11.958) 
Dr             -0.038***             -0.039***        -0.066***            -0.010        
                (-3.197)             (-3.328)           (-3.962)              (-0.593) 
 
Ret             0.058***             0.058***          0.050***            0.069*** 
                (6.209)              (6.202)            (3.802)              (5.199) 
Dr*Ret          0.117***            0.047***           0.061***             0.065*** 
                (10.544)             (2.851)            (2.122)               (3.146) 
Ins                                0.020*** 
                                   (2.242) 
Ins* Dr*Ret                         0.084***            
                                   (5.649)     
Pri                                                  -0.021*** 
                                                     (-1.639) 
Pri* Dr*Ret                                            0.069*** 
                                                     (2.584) 
Npi                                                                       0.033*** 
                                                                          (2.716) 
Npi* Dr*Ret                                                                0.055*** 
                                                                          (3.010) 
 
AdjustR2             0.494                0.496               0.494             0.502 
F-statistic        257.015              161.176             100.441           62.419 
N               11202               11202               5658            5544 
***significant at the 1% level   **significant at the 5% level   *significant at the 10% level 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper takes the China-Shenzhen A-share market in 2009-2015 as 
the research object, and combines principal-agent theory, information 
asymmetry theory and cost-benefit theory to analyze the influence of 
institutional investors' shareholding on accounting conservatism and further 
study the heterogeneity of institutional shareholding. Firstly, we examine the 
overall impact of institutional investors on accounting conservatism. Then 
according to industry and shareholding period, we divide institutional 
investors into stable and transactional type. The impact of stable and 
transactional institutional investors on accounting conservatism is further 
verified. The conclusions of the study are as follows: 
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 (1) The proportion of total shareholding of institutional investors is 
positively related to accounting conservatism. The main reason is that 
institutional investors have higher demand for conservative accounting 
information. Institutional investors themselves have a higher shareholding 
ratio in listed companies, so they have strong incentives and sufficient 
possibilities to interfere with relevant decisions of controlling shareholders 
and management. Their supervision reduces damage to accounting 
conservatism caused by inappropriate decisions, promoting the improvement 
of accounting information quality. 
(2) Stable institutional investors have a greater impact on accounting 
conservatism than transactional investors. Both stable and trading institutional 
investors can promote the improvement of accounting conservatism, but the 
former has a greater impact. This is mainly due to the fact that stable 
institutional investors have a high proportion of shares and long-term 
shareholding period. They have preferences to long-term stable investments 
and tend to obtain long-term stable returns through the increase in the market 
value of the invested companies. Transactional institutional investors pay 
more attention to the market performance of short-term stocks, and generally 
have more commercial links with the invested companies. To some extent this 
avoids the investment loss caused by information asymmetry. Therefore, 
compared with stable institutional investors, Transactional institutional 
investors’ requirements for accounting conservatism are relatively low. 
 The research in this paper provides direct evidence for the positive role 
played by institutional investors in corporate governance. It not only helps to 
understand the economic characteristics of accounting conservatism, but also 
integrates the achievements of predecessors and provides empirical evidence 
about the significant positive relationship between stable institutional 
investors and accounting conservatism. The research conclusions show that 
actively promoting the development of institutional investors, especially 
stable institutional investors, is an important means to improve the accounting 
conservatism of listed companies in China. 
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